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Fundamental questions about incumbent safety have been difficult to answer because of the absence of adequate
measures of incumbent prospects and incumbent quality. If incumbents retire because they are vulnerable, high
reelection rates do not necessarily mean that electoral accountability is absent. Moreover, if the electoral success of
incumbents reflects their high quality, high reelection rates do not necessarily indicate pathology in the system.
Using explicit measures of incumbent prospects and personal quality based on district informant ratings, we find
evidence of strategic retirement by incumbents in the 1998 elections, when standard prospects measures show no
evidence of strategic withdrawal by incumbents. We also find an impact of incumbent quality on vote share
consistent with the idea that high quality incumbents are rewarded in the electoral process. Although many are
skeptical about the implications of incumbent safety in House elections, our results suggest a more optimistic
reconsideration of incumbent electoral security.
‘‘In 2002 and 2004, only 98 percent of incumbents were
re-elected. Appalled, incumbents are working to eliminate
that awful 2 percent.’’
—George F. Will1
R
ecent congressional elections have contributed
to a prevailing cynicism about the amount and
meaning of competition in U.S. House races.
The 2002 and 2004 reelection rates cited by George
Will are only slightly above average, which leads many
observers to conclude that House elections are inert,
featureless affairs dominated by incumbents who
manipulate the district and the electorate to stifle
competition. This sort of popular speculation is
reinforced by an academic literature suggesting that
incumbents employ perquisites of their office to
enhance their own security by reducing competition
and creating disadvantages for potential challengers
(Cover and Brumberg 1982; Fiorina 1977; Mayhew
1974). Needless to say, such assessments do not lead
to optimistic conclusions about representative de-
mocracy in American politics.
Assessing the normative implications of high
reelection rates among U.S. House incumbents has
proven remarkably difficult because studies that do
not take adequate account of incumbent reelection
prospects may fail to appreciate the implications
of strategic retirement. Likewise, if incumbent Rep-
resentatives are high in the qualities and skills that
voters value, and if high quality challengers are
reluctant to enter races against formidable incum-
bents, high incumbent reelection rates should result
(Erikson 1971; Mondak 1995a, 1995b; Zaller 1998).
Reconsidering the meaning of incumbency in House
elections, in short, means allowing for the possibility
that strategic retirement is an anticipation of elec-
toral difficulty and that high-quality incumbents are
rewarded at the polls.
While we do not pretend to have the final word
on how to interpret incumbent reelection rates, we
do introduce two new expert-based measures of
incumbent attributes—incumbent prospects and
incumbent personal quality—to help explain why
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incumbents enjoy sizeable electoral advantages. The
strategy of using expert opinions to measure concepts
that are poorly operationalized through other indi-
cators is common in other fields and disciplines but it
has not been utilized in the study of congressional
elections. We demonstrate that such measures permit
a more nuanced look at the sources of incumbency
advantage. By incorporating our measure of incum-
bent prospects into empirical models, we show that
incumbent retirement is dominated by strategic con-
siderations and that the personal qualities and job
performance that citizens value in elected officials
affect incumbents’ prospects and vote shares. As a
result, we are relatively optimistic about incumbent
reelection rates and the lack of competition in House
elections.
Incumbent Prospects, Strategic
Retirement, and Incumbent Quality
Strategic retirement occurs when incumbents antici-
pate electoral vulnerability and withdraw to avoid
defeat. If incumbents run when their prospects are
good and retire when they are poor, then the
apparent electoral advantage the incumbent’s party
enjoys when incumbents run for reelection may
reflect incumbents’ ability to forecast their future
electoral prospects. Since incumbent reelection rates
are calculated on the basis of incumbents who run,
the absence of an adequate measure of incumbent
prospects could lead us to miss the implications of
strategic withdrawal. In other words, if all incum-
bents were compelled to run, the rate of incumbent
reelection would be lower than would occur if
incumbents retire strategically. Moreover, strategic
withdrawal based on anticipated reactions could
enforce electoral accountability as surely as a negative
election result.
Gelman and King raise the issue of strategic
withdrawal and reentry in their classic article propos-
ing an unbiased measure of the incumbency advant-
age (Gelman and King 1990, 1152): ‘‘If incumbents
frequently decided not to run for reelection because
they knew they would be likely to lose, [our] esti-
mator would be inconsistent.’’ They go on to argue
that the primary reason incumbents would be vul-
nerable is if they are tainted by scandal. Citing a study
of corruption (Peters and Welch 1980), they contend
that strategic retirement is of limited concern because
corruption charges are rare and do not appear to be
strongly related to incumbents’ decisions about run-
ning (Gelman and King 1990). However, missteps in
office and character flaws are often seen by voters and
prospective challengers as a signal about incumbent
quality, which may have electoral consequences. It is
reasonable to assume that incumbents also recognize
those vulnerabilities and might retire as a result.
Gelman and King control for incumbent pros-
pects by including t21 incumbent vote share; some
studies add a measure of district partisanship (e.g,
Brady, D’Onofrio, and Fiorina 2000; Theriault 1998).
Nonetheless, the evidence on incumbent strategic
retirement is mixed (Brace 1985; Hall and Houweling
1995; Moore and Hibbing 1998; Theriault 1998;
Wolak 2007). Cox and Katz point out the mischief
that results from inadequately accounting for incum-
bent prospects:
If we estimate the incumbency advantage simply by
looking at the coefficient on an incumbency dummy
variable in a single vote equation, a portion of the gap
we find between the incumbent party’s performance
with and without its incumbent candidate will be
artifactual. It will be generated by the fact that all
politics is local and the local politicians know it a lot
better than we do [based on measures like previous vote
share], so that incumbents’ entry and exit decisions
reveal information about which way the electoral winds
were blowing.2 (2002, 144)
Although incumbents’ exit decisions may not be en-
tirely strategic (Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994; Hall
and Houweling 1995), we provide a direct test of the
claim that they are driven by prospects. To our knowl-
edge, ours is the first such test that goes beyond a
reliance on standard indicators of previous vote share
and district partisan makeup. Our analysis indicates
strong evidence for strategic retirement among House
incumbents, which suggests that prospects of reelec-
tion, above and beyond observable election outcomes,
enforce electoral accountability.
Our second line of inquiry asks whether the high
prospects of reelection and large vote shares enjoyed
by incumbents result from characteristics of the
incumbent we associate with quality leadership such
as personal character and performance. To consider
this question we must observe the impact of variation
2Concluding that adequate instruments to specify a simultaneous-
equations analysis of entry do not exist, Cox and Katz study
districts where the incumbent’s departure was unexpected (by
death or defeat in a primary). In such cases, the apparent in-
cumbency effect is lower, presumably because the effects of
strategic departure by the incumbent are controlled.
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in quality among incumbents on electoral success.
The most common approach is to treat incumbency
as a dummy variable—the incumbent runs or the seat
is open. This is consistent with the use of office-
holding experience as a measure of challenger quality,
but since all incumbents by definition have office-
holding experience, it does not differentiate among
them. We require a measure of the personal qualities,
skills, and accomplishments that voters value for their
own sake, as distinct from strategic qualities and skills
such as name recognition and fundraising ability.
Such strategic qualities may enhance reelection pros-
pects, but would not alter a negative view of high
incumbent reelection rates. If, in contrast, incum-
bents are rewarded for their competence and personal
quality, their reelection reinforces, rather than under-
mines, core democratic values (Mondak 1995a).
In sum, our approach is to treat both the pros-
pects and incumbent-quality questions as an omitted-
variable problem because neither variable is adequately
measured in studies of the incumbency effect in U.S.
House elections. Absent an adequate measure of
prospects, estimates of the incumbency effect are
biased because of strategic entry and exit decisions;
absent an incumbent-quality measure, attempts to
assess the meaning of high incumbent reelection rates
are impaired because they cannot adequately consider
the possibility that the electoral process rewards high-
quality incumbents and punishes those of lesser
quality. In light of the problems associated with these
two omitted variables for our understanding of
electoral competition in U.S. House elections, we
propose a new strategy for measuring incumbent
prospects and quality.
A New Approach to Measuring
Prospects and Quality
One reason that prospects and quality are omitted
from studies of congressional elections is the absence
of valid and reliable measures. We make use of expert
informants, a measurement strategy common in
other fields and disciplines. Within political science,
informants have been surveyed to measure agency
placement on the left-right scale (Clinton and Lewis
2008) and to place political parties in western
democracies on specific issues or the left-right scale
(Benoit and Laver 2007; Castles and Mair 1984;
Huber and Inglehart 1995; Ray 1999). In fields such
as marketing and organizational behavior, the use
of informants is common to measure characteristics
of organizations that otherwise would be difficult
or impossible to observe (Anderson 1985; Seidler
1974; Van Bruggen, Lilien, and Kacker 2002). To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to use infor-
mants in a congressional study, although Mondak
(1995b) used descriptors culled from the Almanac of
American Politics to rate incumbents’ integrity and
competence.
Our incumbent prospects and quality data were
generated by the Candidate Emergence Study (CES)
surveys of activists and potential candidates in a
national random sample of 197 U.S. House districts.
The activist survey was of Democratic and Repub-
lican national convention delegates and county chairs
who were selected in equal numbers by party in each
district. The potential-candidate survey was of state
legislators whose districts overlapped substantially
with the U.S. House districts in our sample, and of
people in the district named by activists as individ-
uals who would make strong House candidates if they
were to run.3
We surveyed district activists in the summer of
1997 and the potential candidates three to four months
before the filing deadlines in their states. Our goal was
to measure incumbent prospects and quality on the
premise that district activists and potential candidates
understand the local conditions of their districts and
have the information necessary to assess the perform-
ance and personal quality of the incumbent. We sought
their perceptions before incumbent and challenger
entry decisions were made so that our prospects mea-
sure would not be contaminated by events during the
1998 election cycle.
We treat both the activists and potential candi-
dates as expert informants knowledgeable about the
district and the incumbent. We combine the activist
and potential-candidate samples in this study because
we asked all of the relevant questions on both surveys,
and doing so increases the number of informants per
district. The median number of activists per district
is twice the median number of potential candidates
(eight vs. four); therefore including the potential
candidates as informants increases the district-in-
formant samples by 50%.
We measure prospects by asking district experts
to estimate the incumbent’s chances of winning
reelection if he or she runs in the next election and
3We received usable responses from 32% of named potential
candidates and state legislators and from 43% of activists.
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wins the primary.4 We do not have incumbents’
perceptions of their own prospects, nor are the vast
majority of actual challengers included in our sample
of potential candidates in 1998. We assume that
district informants’ perceptions prior to the election
season were shared by individual incumbents and
potential candidates who were deciding whether to
run.5 Our method takes advantage of the judgments
of individuals in the district, each of whom has
incomplete information. Aggregated assessments of
individuals who make independent judgments about
complex phenomena can be remarkably accurate
(Surowiecki 2004). Of course, incumbents’ and chal-
lengers’ electoral prospects change as events leading
up to the election unfold, but the point of measuring
incumbent prospects before the electoral cycle begins
is to capture the exogenous effects of prospects before
they are influenced by challenger entry and incum-
bent exit decisions.6
Exploring Incumbent Prospects
Our use of district informants requires scrutiny of the
validity and reliability of the approach and measures.
The appendix analyzes the validity and reliability of
informant-based indicators based on comparisons
with criterion variables when available, and assessments
of item and interrater reliabilities. In this section we
explore the incumbent prospects measure by analyz-
ing its relationship with election outcomes.
Figure 1 presents the bivariate relationship be-
tween the mean informant rating of incumbent pros-
pects and the vote share the incumbent’s party received
in the fall election. For now, we exclude districts in
which no challenger ran. It is clear from the figure that
prospects are far from perfectly related to vote share.
Indeed, only about 27% of the variance in vote share is
accounted for by prospects (r 5 .52). One explanation
for the error is that we measure prospects well in ad-
vance of the election itself, and much can change be-
tween the point in the cycle when we tapped informant
judgments and Election Day. Another is that prospects
are not the same thing as vote share, and had we asked
informants to forecast the incumbent’s vote share,
the fit would be better. Whatever one makes of the
relationship, a comparison of the lowess and OLS fit
curves indicates that the relationship between vote
share and prospects is essentially linear. While this is
not necessarily what we would expect a priori (Lee
2008), treating the relationship as nonlinear does not
seem warranted nor does it alter or enhance any of the
results reported in this paper.
The median value of incumbent prospects in our
sample is .89. While we do not interpret this as a
precise probability estimate that the average incum-
bent would get reelected if she/he ran in 1998, it is
consistent with the expectation that incumbents
typically had strong prospects. In keeping with the
electoral security of incumbents in 1998, only 6.6%
had their prospects rated lower than .70, with another
FIGURE 1 Incumbent Party 1998 Vote Share by
Incumbent Prospects
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4Questions were scored on 7-point scales with responses ranging
from ‘‘Extremely Unlikely’’ through ‘‘Tossup’’ to ‘‘Extremely
Likely.’’ We scored the items on pseudo-probability scales
ranging in value from .01 to .99, with ‘‘Tossup’’ coded .5. This
scoring makes the data easier to understand and to manipulate,
but we do not think of the results as probability scores. Rather,
they are subjective measures of electoral prospects. We use the
data to make comparative statements rather than as estimates
of the probability of a particular event. The incumbent-prospects
items included a question about the chances the incumbent
would win the party’s nomination if he or she ran, and the
chances the incumbent would win the general election if he or she
won the primary. The prospects measure employed in this paper
is based on the general-election item.
5A major point of the CES was to identify and study the decision-
making process of strong potential candidates who choose not to
run, a key to understanding incumbent deterrence. Elsewhere
(Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004), we provide an individual-level
analysis of the effects of potential candidates’ perceptions of
incumbent prospects on their perceptions of their own chances
and on the chances they would run in their district.
6Our approach contrasts with Abramowitz (1991) and Erikson
and Palfrey (2000) who employ Congressional Quarterly ratings of
competitiveness to measure incumbent prospects. While their
measure is also based on elite perceptions, it is taken after
incumbent- and challenger-entry decisions were made and is
therefore endogenous to the phenomena of interest.
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4.6% estimated by informants as having prospects
between .70 and .75. District informants understood
that incumbents in 1998 were a safe bet for reelection.
Table 1 explores in greater detail the relationship
between informants’ perceptions of incumbent pros-
pects and incumbent vote share in the 1998 elections.
Equation (1) shows a strong bivariate relationship,
such that over the range of observed variation in in-
cumbent prospects in the sample (between .54 and 1.0)
the difference between the incumbent judged most
vulnerable and the safest incumbent is about 34
general-election percentage points. Equation (2) in-
cludes additional variables that should relate to the fall
election results and that are typically used as measures
of incumbent prospects: the incumbent’s vote share in
the previous election, the partisan makeup of the
district, and the party of the incumbent. Not surpris-
ingly, the effect of prospects drops when these indica-
tors are included. However, even with these surrogates
for prospects included, a strong and significant inde-
pendent effect of prospects on incumbents’ vote share
remains. The expected difference between the most
vulnerable and the most secure incumbents in our
sample is approximately 13% in vote share, independ-
ent of how well the incumbent ran in 1996 and of the
partisan makeup of the district. This is strong evidence
that district informants had access to local information
relevant to their incumbents’ electoral prospects and
that our measure provides substantial leverage beyond
the standard indicators.
One possible concern is that the results in equation
(2) may be produced by ‘‘easy’’ cases such as invul-
nerable incumbents who routinely dissuade a chal-
lenge. These cases might produce outliers that drive the
effect of prospects, inflating our confidence in the
measure. To address this and the related possibility that
the results are produced by incumbents who are
inordinately vulnerable, equation (3) includes dummy
variables for districts in which no challenger ran against
the incumbent in 1998 and the Congressional Quarterly
key race dummy. This provides a stiff test for the
prospects measure because both the willingness of
challengers to run against an incumbent and the CQ
indicator are endogenous to incumbent prospects,
but over controlling in this way does not eliminate a
strong and significant independent effect of prospects.7
We conclude from Table 1 that our informant surveys
add significantly to our ability to measure incumbent
prospects for reelection, beyond the information con-
tained in other generally available indicators.
Incumbent Retirement and
Challenger Entry
We begin by examining the bivariate relationship
between a grouped version of the prospects measure
and various measures of candidate entry. As the
results in Table 2 make clear, incumbent prospects
relate in sensible ways to candidate-entry decisions by
incumbents, challengers, and primary contestants.
Incumbent retirement and the appearance of a
serious—or any—challenger appears to be highly
responsive to prospects. As incumbent prospects
drop, the likelihood of a strong challenger jumps
appreciably.8 The incidence of incumbents receiving
primary challenges declined as their prospect ratings
improved, as did contested primaries in the opposi-
tion party. Vulnerable incumbents should attract in-
party challenges, especially in one-party districts,
because winning the primary is the only avenue to
taking the seat. Out-party primaries are also con-
tested when incumbents are vulnerable because the
value of the out party’s nomination increases as the
incumbent’s chances of general-election victory
decline.9
Table 3 presents multivariate analyses of incum-
bents’ decision to run and strong-challenger entry in
1998. The analysis of incumbents’ decisions whether
to retire or run for reelection is especially revealing
because the model based on standard indicators of
incumbent prospects fails to detect any evidence of
7Of course, 1996 incumbent vote share and district partisanship
also affect incumbent vote share independent of prospects. Some
of these effects are undoubtedly due to measurement error in our
prospects measure, but some also reflect the fact that incumbent
vote share at t21 and district partisanship are better criterion
variables for incumbent vote share at t than even an error-free
incumbent-prospects measure. To be on the conservative side we
include them as controls in subsequent analysis.
8Our measure of serious challengers includes all candidates with
prior electoral experience and those serious amateurs who
contributed more than $31,833 of personal funds to their own
campaign (Maestas and Rugeley 2008). Only 25% of all non-
incumbent candidates, experienced or not, contributed more
than this amount during the 1994–2000 period (in constant 2000
dollars). Amateurs who commit substantial resources to their
own campaigns raise funds and win votes at levels that rival that
of many experienced office holders. Based on this measure, 60%
of races in 1998 had a weak challenger or no challenger, 15%
had a serious amateur challenger, and 25% had an experienced
challenger. Our substantive conclusions do not differ when we
use office-holding experience to measure challenger quality.
9Other indicators of ‘‘divisive primaries’’ are also associated with
incumbent prospects in the same way, including the number of
primary candidates who run and the share of the vote they
receive. Lazarus (2005) provides an excellent critique of the
literature on the ‘‘divisive primary effect’’ from the perspective of
incumbent vulnerability and challenger entry.
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strategic retirement in 1998. The model includes
standard indicators of incumbent electoral vulner-
ability, including vote share in 1996 and partisan
makeup of the district. However, none of these vari-
ables significantly relates to incumbent retirement/
entry. The only significant predictor in equation (1)
is incumbent seniority, which is a measure of the
incumbent’s age or career stage rather than of electoral
vulnerability. The absence of strategic retirement by
incumbents may not be surprising since 1998 was an
election without a national tide of the sort that might
alert incumbents of their vulnerability.
In contrast, our informant-based measure of
prospects performs quite well in predicting retire-
ment (see equation 2). The coefficient is correctly
signed and statistically significant. Moreover, analysis
of predicted probabilities shows that the effect is
substantively significant. As one would expect, when
prospects are set to their mean value, along with all
other variables in the model, the predicted proba-
bility of the incumbent running is .99. This comports
well with expectations since most incumbents choose
to run for reelection rather than leave. However,
when prospects are set at its lowest value in our
sample (.54) and all other variables are at their mean
or mode, the probability of the incumbent running is
only .12. Indeed, it is not until prospects increase to
about .66 that incumbents are more likely than not to
run. Thus, including the prospects measure provides
a clear indication that incumbents retired in response
to diminished prospects for reelection, even in the
absence of a national tide.
Equation 3 shows that serious challenger entry
is responsive to the standard measures of incumbent
prospects such as the incumbent’s previous vote share,
district party balance, and the party of the incumbent.
However, equation (4) indicates that our measure of
prospects also has a strong, independent effect on chal-
lenger entry. The effects of incumbent prospects on the
decisions of incumbents and strong challengers can
be seen in Figure 2. As incumbent prospects increase,
the probability of a strong challenger emerging drops
dramatically.
In short, prospects matter—a lot. Evidence from
district informants supports the Cox and Katz (2002,
144) assertion that local politicians know their dis-
trict (and their incumbent) far better than remote
observers relying on surrogate measures like district
partisanship and previous vote share. By including an
explicit measure of prospects, we confirm that incum-
bents and strong challengers enter races they think they
can win and opt out of races they expect to lose.
The Effect of Incumbent Quality
If prior elections select high-quality candidates who
then become incumbents, high reelection rates should
occur both because potential challengers would be
deterred from challenging well-regarded incumbents,
and because of voter satisfaction with their representa-
tive (Erikson 1971; Mondak, 1995a, 1995b; Zaller 1998).
In other words, if the electoral process works as it
should, poor-quality incumbents should be weeded out
and high quality incumbents should be rewarded with
reelection. If incumbents succeed because they are high
quality, then the state of electoral competition in U.S.
House elections may be less problematic than some
conclude. To consider this question we must be able to
TABLE 1 Incumbent Prospects and Incumbent Vote Share (OLS)
(1) (2) (3)
b SE b SE b SE
Incumbent prospects, 1998 74.126** 12.506 27.924* 11.773 25.472** 7.565
Incumbent vote share, 1996 .500** .089 .209** .058
District partisanship (favor incumbent) .343** .106 .327** .065
Democratic incumbent 24.156* 1.956 21.307 1.212
CQ key race, 1998 23.252 1.849
No challenger, 1998 21.109** 1.290
Constant 5.888 11.056 21,337 9.409 14.825 6.488
Adjusted R2 .168 .431 .786
F 35.13** 32.97** 104.21**
N 170 170 170
**p , .01; *p , .05; two-tailed tests.
Note: Analysis restricted to districts in which the same incumbent ran in 1996 and 1998.
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observe how variation in incumbent quality affects
electoral success.
Studies rarely distinguish among incumbents on
the basis of quality.10 Instead, they treat the advan-
tages associated with incumbency as hinging on an
unspecified combination of skills, resources, and
qualities with the analysis focusing on whether or
not the incumbent runs, rather than the effect of
variation in quality among incumbents. Our approach
is to measure the personal qualities, skills, and per-
formance of incumbents. If incumbents are rewarded
for their personal quality, then their reelection rein-
forces, rather than undermines, core democratic
values.
We asked informants to evaluate incumbents on
items that most citizens would regard as important
for the job of Representative, including personal
integrity, ability to work with other leaders, grasp
of the issues, ability to solve problems, ability to keep
in touch with the district, and legislative accom-
plishment. Evidence on the reliability and validity of
the personal quality measure is summarized in the
appendix.
Incumbents’ quality may help explain their safety
by at least two mechanisms. The first is that low-
quality incumbents may have reduced electoral pros-
pects and either be deterred from running for
reelection or they may attract a strong challenger.
Second, incumbents of relatively high quality may be
rewarded at the polls while incumbents of lesser
quality are punished, over and above any effect of
quality on prospects, challenger entry, or incumbent
retirement (cf. Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2007;
Cox and Katz 1996). Both mechanisms are linked to
electoral sanctions: the first by the effect of quality on
prospects, and the second by the reactions of voters
on Election Day. If either or both mechanisms are at
work, a quality effect will suggest that high reelection
rates are due in part to the electoral process working
as it should by rewarding high-quality incumbents
and weeding out those of lesser quality.
Table 4 shows that incumbents judged high in
their quality had more secure reelection prospects.
The difference between the lowest and highest quality
incumbents’ prospects—0.098—is large enough to
affect an incumbent’s decision to run or retire. Like-
wise, a drop in incumbent prospects of .098 increases
the chances of drawing a strong challenger by nearly
.12. Based on the results in Table 3 (equation 4), the
odds of drawing a challenger shift from 1 in 5 (.21) to
about 1 in 3 (.33). This effect, therefore, is consistent
with the idea that the electoral process rewards higher
quality incumbents indirectly though electoral pros-
pects. Moreover, incumbent personal quality has an
effect similar to other variables normally considered
to be key determinants of prospects such as previous
vote margin and district partisanship. A one standard
deviation increase over the mean of the incumbent’s
previous vote margin (an increase of 12%) boosts
predicted prospects from .885 to .909; a one standard
deviation increase in district partisanship (10% in-
crease toward the incumbent party) increases pros-
pects from .885 to .906; and a one standard deviation
increase in incumbent quality (an increase of .51 on
the 7-point scale), leads to an increase in prospects
from .885 to .904. Thus, the magnitude of the
response to personal quality is similar to that of
TABLE 2 Incumbents’ Prospects for Winning and Candidate Entry, 1998
Incumbent General Election Prospects
, .68 .682.749 .752.849 .852.949 .95+
Incumbent retired 37.5% 21.4% 0% 3.9% 3.2%
Experienced challenger rana 62.5% 42.9% 36.6% 19.4% 12.9%
Serious Challenger ranb 100% 71.4% 48.8% 36.6% 12.9%
No challenger ran 0% 7.1% 19.5% 24.3% 29.0%
In-party primary contested 50.0% 42.9% 7.3% 22.3% 12.9%
Out-party primary contested 75.0% 71.4% 19.5% 28.2% 16.3%
N of districts (8) (14) (41) (103) (31)
aChallenger had elective office-holding experience before running for House.
bChallenger meets office-holding or top-quartile criteria.
10A notable exception is Jeffery Mondak (1995b), who coded
descriptions of incumbents in the Almanac of American Politics to
measure incumbent quality, which he conceived as composed of
integrity and competence. In addition, some have studied the
effects of scandal, which does speak to one source of variation in
incumbent quality (e.g., Jacobson and Dimock 1994).
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other variables we typically associate with incum-
bency advantages.11
A stronger test of the claim that incumbent
quality has an electoral effect is to evaluate the direct
impact of incumbent quality on vote share. Table 5
provides this test based on a Heckman model of
incumbents’ vote share in the 1998 election condi-
tioned on the incumbent’s decision to run. With this
setup we recognize the potential importance of the
incumbent’s entry decision in shaping the campaign
that follows, including the entry of quality challengers
and the resources they attract. Moreover, variables
that affect incumbents’ decisions about running or
retiring may also influence their vote share in the
general election, and these factors may be excluded or
imperfectly measured in our analysis.
The positive effect of incumbent quality on 1998
vote share supports the expectation that incumbents
are rewarded when they are of high quality and
punished when they are of lesser quality. Over the
observed range of variation in incumbent quality in
the sample, the difference in expected vote share won
by the highest quality incumbent is 7.5% higher than
the vote share won by the lowest quality incumbent.
The results in Table 5 show that the incumbent
prospects variable has no independent effect on vote
share, once its impact on incumbent entry, challenger
TABLE 3 Candidate Entry in the 1998 Elections (Probit)
Incumbent Runs for Reelection Serious Challenger Enters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Incumbent vote
share, 1996
20.006 0.034 20.052 0.040 20.104** 0.028 20.087** 0.030
District partisanship
(favor
incumbent)
0.012 0.024 20.011 0.029 20.026 0.019 20.023 0.019
Democratic
incumbent
20.239 0.424 0.455 0.590 0.694* 0.266 0.540 0.276
Incumbent
spending, 1996
(logged)
0.235 0.218 0.459 0.244 20.195 0.168 20.212 0.172
Challenger
spending, 1996
(logged)
20.350 0.238 20.668* 0.328 0.027 0.116 0.072 0.119
Serious challenger
ran, 1996
0.290 0.405 0.640 0.519 0.278 0.267 0.266 0.272
Incumbent war
chest, 1996
(logged)
20.093 0.148 20.347 0.198 0.111 0.098 0.159 0.101
Incumbent’s
number of terms
served
20.109** 0.035 20.142** 0.045 0.038 0.028 0.033 0.029
Incumbent’s
prospects, 1998
— 9.935** 2.797 — 23.331* 1.538
Constant 4.168 5.776 3.350 7.155 7.919* 3.544 8.883* 3.614
Log Likelihood 234.754 225.752 291.696 289.23
x2 15.23 33.23** 81.67** 86.61**
Pseudo R2 0.180 0.392 0.308 0.327
N 196 196 196 196
**p , .01; *p , .05; two-tailed tests.
11One possibility is that the size of the personal quality effect
stems from rationalization bias in survey responses since the
measures of prospects and quality are drawn from the same
survey instrument. However, there is no evidence of this based on
a split-half analysis. We randomly divided district informants
into two groups and drew the prospects measure from one group
and the quality measure from the other. There was little differ-
ence in the magnitude of the coefficient in using the spilt-half
versus the full sample (.038 p , .01 in one test and .033 p , .05
in the other).
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entry, and challenger expenditures is taken into ac-
count. This is appropriate since incumbents’ prospects
ought not have any direct causal impact on vote share
aside from influencing candidate entry and other
investments in the race.
That we find an impact of incumbent quality on
vote share after controlling for prospects and in-
cumbent and challenger entry is evidence that the
electoral process responds to variation in incumbent
quality. The average vote share among incumbents in
our sample who were challenged was 64% with a
standard deviation of 9.3%, so it is plausible that the
lowest quality incumbents would slip into the mar-
ginal category because of their relatively low quality.
In a year when other factors worked against low-
quality incumbents, their vulnerabilities could easily
cumulate in electoral defeat.
As noted, a variety of mechanisms could account
for how quality affects vote share. If lower quality
incumbents have reduced prospects and therefore
attract stronger challengers, such challengers should
be in a better position to exploit vulnerabilities in the
incumbent’s character or record. This mechanism
should be largely accounted for in our analysis, to the
extent that lesser-quality incumbents have reduced
prospects for victory, attract stronger challengers, or
provide leverage for challengers to raise more money
against them.12
Why, then, might our analysis reveal a direct
effect of incumbent quality on vote share, especially
when the model explicitly includes incumbent pros-
pects? In other work we explore the possibility that
voters themselves pick up on variation in incumbent
quality, a finding that would further corroborate
McCurley and Mondak’s (1995) observation that voters’
affect toward incumbents is influenced by quality.
These and other mechanisms for a direct effect of
incumbent quality on vote reflect the possibility that,
although informants may take quality into account
when they assess their Representative’s prospects for
reelection, they miss a significant part of the effect,
perhaps because it is not entirely rooted in a strategic
calculation by potential candidates and/or other key
players in the process.
Conclusion
What are we to make of high reelection rates by
incumbents to the U.S. House of Representatives?
Because the behavior of incumbents and potential
challengers is strategic, answering this fundamental
question has been difficult, perhaps to a surprising
degree. That incumbents are often reelected must be
assessed in the context of their strategic calculations about
whether to run at all. We have found that incumbent
retirement is sensitive to their prospects for reelection. If
incumbents are good at forecasting their own electoral
fates when they opt out they forestall the electoral
competition that would have occurred if they had run.
If incumbents were perfect prognosticators of
their electoral fate, we might never observe them
TABLE 4 OLS Analysis of the Effect of Incumbent
Quality on Electoral Prospects
b SE
Incumbent personal quality 0.036** 0.011
District partisanship (favor incumbent) 0.002* 0.001
Incumbent vote share, 1996 0.002** 0.001
Democratic incumbent 20.044** 0.013
Serious challenger, 1996 20.008 0.014
Challenger spending, 1996 (logged) 0.008 0.006
Incumbent spending, 1996 (logged) 20.021* 0.009
Incumbent cash on hand, 1996 (logged) 0.014** 0.005
Incumbent number of terms served 20.002 0.001
Constant .682** .139
Adjusted R2 .271
F 9.05**
N 196
**p , .01; *p , .05; two-tailed tests.
FIGURE 2 Probability of Incumbent and Serious
Challenger Running
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12Incumbents who attracted an experienced challenger in our
sample were somewhat lower in quality than those who did not,
although the effect is not statistically significant. Nonetheless,
there is support for the deterrence effect of incumbent personal
quality (Mondak 1995b).
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suffering electoral defeat. But incumbents sometimes
are defeated, and they do more or less well in vote
share, even when they are reelected. Part, though not all,
of the explanation for how well they do is attributable
to the quality and vigor of the challenge they draw. In
addition, we find that electoral consequences follow as a
consequence of incumbent quality. The quality effect
works indirectly by affecting incumbent reelection
prospects and directly by altering their vote share.
One might take our findings to indicate that
electoral trouble or defeat of an incumbent reflects
behavior by the incumbent that is out of equilibrium
(cf. Buchler 2006). If an incumbent is defeated, he or
she failed to anticipate the defeat and retire. A certain
number of such miscalculations occur because poli-
ticians cannot perfectly forecast how national con-
ditions will affect their reelection bid, or how strong
the challenger might prove to be, or how local con-
ditions will play out in the election. Surely one reason
some incumbents venture into the arena even when
defeat awaits them is that they fail to appreciate how
their personal quality will be judged by voters. How-
ever, if the electoral process filters out politicians
(including incumbents) of poor quality, the average
incumbent will be of relatively high quality and most
will win reelection.
Even in an apparently placid year like 1998 when
the number of incumbent defeats appears to justify
George Will’s sarcastic view of incumbent safety, the
push and pull of electoral politics beneath the surface
reflects systematic variation in the quality of incum-
bents. While it may be too much to claim that
incumbents win reelection because they do a good
job, it does not seem extravagant to conclude that
their quality stimulates electoral reward and sanction
consistent with a relatively optimistic reading of how
the electoral process works.
Strategic withdrawal by incumbents, strategic
entry and resource deployment by challengers, and
the impact of variation in the quality of incumbents
means that a substantial amount of electoral com-
petition is avoided not necessarily or only because in-
cumbents manipulate the process to create an unfair
advantage, but because they reap electoral rewards for
doing their jobs well and have learned to anticipate
the reactions of the electorate and avoid defeat when
it is likely. Our reassessment of incumbency and
electoral competition in elections places more weight
on the positive consequences of candidate entry and
incumbent quality, and less on the cynical manipu-
lation of the electoral process by incumbents hell-
bent on reelection.
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Appendix
Assessing the Informant-Based Measures
While we are the first to rely on district informants in
a study of congressional elections, the use of inform-
ants in other fields and disciplines is common
(Clinton and Lewis 2008; Marks et al. 2007; Ray 1999;
Van Bruggen, Lilien, and Kacker 2002). As with other
studies, widely accepted criterion variables are not
available for some of the concepts we measure. Indeed,
a primary reason for using informant-based measures is
to capture characteristics of incumbents that cannot
be otherwise measured. However, we can validate the
general approach of using informant-based measures in
U.S. House elections by comparing informant assess-
ments of incumbent ideology and prospects to other
well-accepted indicators such as roll-call votes and
election vote shares.
The most direct comparison we can make is
whether our informant-based measure rates the ideol-
ogy of the incumbent similarly to ADA or NOMI-
NATE scores, measures that are widely accepted as
valid and reliable (see Bishin 2005; Poole and Rosenthal
1997; Smith, Herrera, and Herrera 1990). There is a
strong correlation between our informant-based place-
ments and incumbents’ ADA scores (r5 .92) and
NOMINATE scores (r5 .94), which remains quite
strong within party (r5 .75 and .72 for Democrats
and Republicans, respectively).
An analysis of errors (following Marks et al.
2007) in both the ideological placement and pros-
pects variables (using NOMINATE and ADA scores
as criterion variables for the informant placement
variable and vote share as the criterion variable for
prospects) shows that the error in the informant-
based measures increases as the size of the informant
sample decreases and as the within-district variance
of informant ratings increases. These effects are weak
(R2 # .11) and there is no significant effect of other
variables in the analysis, including incumbent senior-
ity, party, and incumbent extremism.
Assessing the incumbent-quality measure is more
difficult because no clear criterion variables are avail-
able. We have experimented with Fowler’s (2006)
measures of bill sponsorship, bill passage, and ‘‘con-
nectedness,’’ based on patterns of cosponsorship that
describes the extent of the social network of each
member in Congress. The number of bills passed and
connectedness are significantly related to our inform-
ant-based measure of quality, but they are not related
to vote share, nor does including them in our analysis
of vote share affect the impact of the incumbent-
quality results reported in the paper. The general prob-
lem with measures linked to member behavior in the
institution is that they often reflect a strategic response
by incumbents, rather than capturing the underlying
characteristics fundamental to the concept of incum-
bent quality.
We have also evaluated the between- and within-
district reliabilities of the informant measures by
making use of the accuracy of informant judgments
about incumbent ideology when building the quality
measures. Errors in individual informant judgments
stem from two sources: random error and systematic
bias. We know that there is partisan bias in individual
informant ratings of incumbent quality, with inform-
ants rating incumbents in the same party substantially
higher than they rate incumbents in the opposite party
(Stone, Maisel, and Maestas 2004). As a result, the
quality items (and, as a precaution, all other informant
ratings) are corrected for partisan bias.13 To correct for
random errors that occur when experts lack informa-
tion on one or more dimension, we weight the im-
portance of each informant in calculating district means
by the degree to which they accurately place incumbents
on the ideological spectrum (Clinton and Lewis 2008).14
Our assumption is that those unable to accurately
identify incumbent ideology are less informed about
other characteristics of the incumbent as well.
Our primary assessment of the validity and
reliability of personal-quality measures is based on
three distinct approaches. The first examines the
13We adjust individual informant ratings by regressing informant
ratings on a party dummy (11 to indicate the informant and
incumbent are in the same party; 21 when they are in opposite
parties), and adjusting each informant’s rating to the intercept
(0 implies an independent informant).
14The assumption is that informants closer in their rating to the
NOMINATE score will also be more accurate, on average, in
their ratings on other qualities. We calculate d 5 |(z-ideology) –
(z-NOMINATE)|. The accuracy weight W is the inverse of d:
W 5 (1/d).5
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dimensionality of the 10-item scale to determine
whether the survey items included in the personal
quality indicator are part of a single construct.
Cronbach’s alpha is .92 on the 10 items used to
construct the quality measure. In addition, a factor
analysis produces a single factor with an eigenvalue.
1.0 (5.63; 84% of the variance explained). The
average loading on the first dimension was .77. Both
the scale-reliability and factor-analytic results support
the unidimensional structure to the data.
A second approach assesses the reliability of the
incumbent quality measure as a single item based on
one-way analysis of variance designed to evaluate the
reliability of aggregated measures (Jones and Norrander
1996). The reliability coefficient approaches 1.0 or
perfect reliability as the ratio of the cross-district
variance to the variance assigned to the district and
individual levels approaches unity. By this method,
the reliability of the incumbent quality measure is .66,
or ‘‘moderately reliable’’ by the Jones-Norrander
(1995 302) standard.
A final measure developed by Brown and Hauen-
stein (2005) captures interrater agreement (awg) based
on the ratio of variation among raters within districts
as a ratio of maximum possible variance within the
district. The theoretical range of the measure is 21 to
+1, from maximum variance among raters to max-
imum agreement (Brown and Huaenstein 2005, 174).
The personal quality measure has an interrater reli-
ability awg5 .77, which is a moderately strong level of
reliability by the Brown and Hauenstein standard.
In sum, where available, criterion variables indicate
strong evidence in support of informant-based meas-
ures. In the case of the personal-quality measure,
reliabilities exceed accepted standards by several quite
different models of reliability. The validity and reli-
ability analysis recommends the use of district inform-
ants as a possible solution to a variety of measurement
issues in the study of congressional elections, including
questions that go beyond this particular paper. If
district informants can provide reliable and valid
information about incumbents, they probably can do
likewise about challengers, which could enrich meas-
ures of challenger quality and of incumbent-challenger
differentials.
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